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Rethinking the Role of Politics in United
States Immigration Law: The Helsinki




In 1975 the United States become a signatory to the Helsinki Ac-
cords,1 pledging itself to facilitate and foster greater international
freedom of movement and exchange of ideas. In general, the United
States has attempted to meet all of its obligations under the Ac-
cords. However, certain aspects of United States domestic law oper-
ate in direct contravention of the provisions of the Accords. In par-
ticular, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),2 the
basic statute governing immigration matters, contains several provi-
sions that inhibit the free flow of ideas and persons across national
boundAries. Known collectively as the "ideological exclusion" provi-
sions, these provisions have been and continue to be used to bar en-
try of noncitizens to the United States because of their espousal of
proscribed ideologies.'
* Assistant General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference. B.A. 1976, Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico; J.D. 1980, Antioch School of Law; LL.M. 1983, Georgetown
University Law Center.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the United States Catholic Conference.
1. Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, 37 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 323 (Aug. 1, 1975), reprinted in INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 470.1
(R. Lillich ed. 1986) [hereinafter Final Act].
2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 101-360, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1503 (1982) [hereinafter INA].
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) contains the exclusion provisions of the INA. Exclusion
proceedings are used to determine the inadmissibility of an alien into the territorial limits
This Article's purpose is to examine the statutory framework and
case law addressing the ideological exclusion of aliens from the
United States in light of the Helsinki Accords. It is important to
note that Congress has suspended temporarily the application of cer-
tain ideological provisions until March 1, 1989." This measure was
passed with a "sunset" provision because both houses of Congress
have expressed interest in comprehensive, permanent revisions in the
area of deportation and exclusion.5 This Article is intended to con-
tribute to the ongoing dialogue concerning such permanent and
much needed changes. The Article also will analyze proposed
changes to the INA and suggest amendments and revisions to
United States immigration law.
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK: HELSINKI ACCORDS
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Con-
ference), held in Helsinki, Finland, began in the summer of 1973
and lasted for approximately two years, culminating in a Final Act
signed by participating states on August 1, 1975.0 The idea for these
talks dates back to 1954, when the Soviet Union proposed to discuss
European security with the United States and its NATO allies.7 Al-
of the United States, and may take place before entry (denial of visa abroad when an
inspector determines inadmissibility), or after entry (deportation proceedings based on an
excludable ground when entering or upon reentering). See generally 1 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 232-234 (rev. ed. 1987); T.
ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 16, 20 (1985).
4. On December 22, 1987, the President signed into law the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331(Dec. 22, 1987). Section 901, title IX, of the Authorization Act suspends until March 1,
1989 sections of the INA that had prohibited admission into the United States because
of beliefs or associations, or the anticipated content of statements made by a noncitizen
while in the United States. The provision extends to visa applications made during 1988,
admissions sought after December 31, 1987, and before March 1, 1989, and deportations
based on activities during 1988 or for which deportation proceedings are pending during
the same year. Id. § 901(d), 101 Stat. at 1400. The temporary change does not apply to
denials of visas or admission based on foreign policy considerations or national security
as long as these exclusions are not based on beliefs or activities protected by the Consti-
tution, and terrorist activities. 133 CONG. REC. H 11,297-351 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1987);
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 475, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 72, 73, 162-65 (1987) [hereinafter
REP. No. 475]; See Alien - To Free Speech, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1987, at A30, col. 1.
5. A "sunset" provision limits the applicable time period of a statute. For the
applicable time period of section 901(a), see supra note 4. See REP. No. 475, supra note
4, at 165; 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1391-92 (Dec. 21, 1987); Blumenthal, Congress
Lifts Political Beliefs Bar to Aliens Under McCarran-Walter Act, Wash. Post, Dec. 17,
1987, at All, col. 1.
6. See Final Act, supra note 1. The Final Act is separated into four primary
"baskets" or sets of issues that were negotiated: Basket I relates to questions of European
security; Basket II relates to cooperation in economics, science and technology, and the
environment; Basket III involves cooperation in humanitarian areas; and Basket IV is
intended to set up follow-up actions.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1149, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1159, 1161.
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most twenty years later the political atmosphere of d6tente made it
possible to bring together virtually all the states of Europe (except
Albania), the United States, Canada and a number of non-European
Mediterranean states which attended the conference as observers.
The negotiations resulted in unanimous agreement, with all partici-
pating states becoming signatories to the newly created international
instrument.8
The Helsinki Accords (the Accords) do not have the force of a
treaty. They can be described as either an international declaration
or a United Nations resolution.9 As such, obligations created under
the agreement are moral, rather than legal, in character. Notwith-
standing the agreement's nontreaty status, Congress ratified it and,
in 1976, created a joint executive-congressional commission for the
purpose of furthering the objectives of the Accords. 10 Congress spe-
cifically intended that the commission enhance East-West economic
cooperation and generate "a greater interchange of people and ideas
between East and West."11
A basic objective of the Conference was to foster cooperation in
humanitarian and other fields. This objective is the focus of one part
of the Accords, referred to as Basket III.12 Both the United States
and its NATO allies pushed strongly for the inclusion of Basket III
as a major component of the Accords." Basket III addresses basic
principles of international travel, as well as freedom of expression
and the exchange of ideas. The participating states pledged to "facil-
itate freer movement and contacts individually and collectively,
whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and
organizations ... .
In order to realize the goal of greater international travel, the Ac-
cords urge signatory states to attempt "gradually to simplify and to
administer flexibly the provisions for exit and entry" applicable to
their respective territories.1 5 In addition, the Accords encourage
member states to "facilitate the dissemination of oral information
8. Id.
9. For a discussion of United Nations resolutions and international declarations,
see generally W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 46-51 (1962).
10. See Act of June 3, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-304, 90 Stat. 661 (1976) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3003-3009 (1985 & Supp. 1987)); see also H.R. REP. No.
1149, supra note 7, at 1159 (legislative history).
11. See 22 U.S.C. § 3002.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1149, supra note 7, at 1161.
13. Id.
14. Final Act, supra note 1, at 470.7.
15. Id. at 470.8.
through the encouragement of lectures and lecture tours by personal-
ities and specialists . . . as well as exchange of opinions at round
table meeting, seminars, symposia, summer schools, congresses, and
other bilateral and multilateral meetings."' 6
As a signatory to the Accords, the United States has committed
itself to carrying out these obligations. Although Congress did pass
legislation aimed at bringing the United States into greater compli-
ance with the Accords, the legislation did little to alter the treatment
accorded politically controversial aliens by existing immigration pro-
cedures and requirements."7 The chairman of the Helsinki Commis-
sion recently testified before Congress that "the ideological restric-
tions of the [INA] . . . contradict the very spirit of the Helsinki
Accords, and at the same time damage the role of the United States
in the Helsinki process."' The Chairman further testified that the
United States is the "only signatory state that systematically ex-
cludes foreigners on the basis of their beliefs and affiliations as a
formal statutory matter."' 9 As such, the United States cannot claim
an exemplary compliance record in an area relating directly to the
humanitarian objectives that the Accords were intended to further.
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
Historical Background
The development of United States immigration laws, particularly
the exclusion of aliens because of their political beliefs or associa-
tions, began with the Immigration Act of 1903.20 As a direct result
of the assassination of President William McKinley by a Czech an-
archist, the statute focused on individuals who belonged to organiza-
tions that advocated the violent overthrow of the government.2' The
exclusionary principles established by the 1903 Act remained essen-
tially unchanged in the course of subsequent recodifications by Con-
gress throughout the early decades of the twentieth century, with the
Anarchist Act of 1918 constituting the basic law in this area until
16. Id. at 470.10-12. The Reagan Administration is on record as affirming these
principles: "Expanding contact borders and permitting a free exchange or interchange of
information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the
world reduces it." N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1984, at A8, col. 3 (transcript of President Rea-
gan's speech on Soviet-American relations).
17. Carliner, U.S. Compliance with the Helsinki Final Act: The Treatment of
Aliens, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397 (1980); see also infra note 138 and accompany-
ing text.
18. Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Im-
migration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1987) (testimony of Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman of the Hel-
sinki Commission) [hereinafter 1987 Hearing].
19. Id.
20. Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1222.
21. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 247a.
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the middle of the century. 22
A major change occurred in 1940 with passage of the Alien Regis-
tration Act,23 which expanded the temporal reach of these exclusion-
ary provisions. Aliens now could be excluded from entry if at any
time in the past they had advocated doctrines involving political vio-
lence against the government.24 The Alien Registration Act estab-
lished the principle that having once been associated with objectiona-
ble political beliefs, a person could be permanently forbidden to
enter or reenter the United States.25 If these restrictions reflected the
political atmosphere in the United States before World War II, the
immediate aftermath of the war and the ensuing cold war brought
about changes that added greater specificity to the procedures and
requirements which applied to exclusion of aliens on ideological
grounds.
After the war, relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union became particularly strained, and the late 1940s and early
1950s saw the onset of the cold war between the world's two new
superpowers. In this tense and suspicious atmosphere, important
changes in United States immigration law were not long in coming.
In 1950, Congress enacted the Internal Security Act.26 Section 22 of
the Internal Security Act was the first specific exclusion of any pre-
sent or past member of the Communist Party or its affiliates from
admission to the United States. Further, the Internal Security Act
declared in sweeping language that no alien would be allowed to
enter the United States "to engage in activities which would be prej-
udicial to the public interest, or would endanger the public welfare
or safety of the United States. 27
Modern Statutory Framework
In 1952, Congress overrode President Truman's veto and passed
the INA.2" The INA retained the old grounds for ideological exclu-
22. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 911; Act of Feb. 5, 1917,
ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874; Anarchist Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012.
23. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670.
24. See I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 247a.
25. Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. at 673.
26. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
27. Id. § 22(a), 64 Stat. at 1006.
28. President Truman wanted to liberalize the immigration laws. He stated of the
ideological exclusion legislation: "seldom has a bill exhibited the distrust evidenced here
for aliens and citizens alike .. " (cited in Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 625
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 763 (1972)). Truman
appointed a commission to assess the newly passed legislation, and the commission issued
sions while adding new ones. The exclusion grounds are found in the
INA, Title II, section 212.29 There are three separate ideological ex-
clusion sections, two of which, sections 212(a)(27) and (29), overlap.
Noncitizens who are excludable under section 212(a)(29) may also
be, and sometimes are, excluded under subsection 212(a)(27).30 Both
sections are broad in scope and at least one part of section
212(a)(29) already has been repealed by Congress.31
Because much of the controversy surrounding the ideological ex-
clusion provisions concerns sections 212(a)(27) and (28), section
212(a)(29) will be discussed only to the extent that it is incorporated
in proposed legislative changes.32
Section 212(a)(27)
The language of section 212(a)(27), which is basically the same as
section 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, purports to exclude
"[a)liens who the consular officer or the Attorney General know or
has reason to believe seek to enter the United States solely, princi-
pally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudi-
cial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security
of the United States.13 3 The scope of this provision is very broad,
and does not limit the types of concerns that the government may
use to bar aliens from entering the country. It has been recognized
its findings on January 1, 1953, concluding that the immigration laws "flout fundamental
American traditions and ideas, display a lack of faith in America's future, damage
American prestige and position among other nations, [and] ignore the lessons of the
American way of life." T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 54.
29. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (contains 33 classes of aliens who are barred
from entering the United States on economic, health, criminal, quasi-criminal and moral,
entry and documentary, technical, and political grounds); see generally T. ALEINIKOFr &
D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 184-92.
30. Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1983: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1984) (testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs, Joan M. Clark) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing].
31. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 8 U.S.C. § 1102 (1950) (reference
to section 7 of Subversive Activities Control Act in subsection 212(a)(C), repealed by
Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, 81 Stat. 765 (1968)).
32. INA § 212(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(29) states:
Aliens with respect to whom the consular officer or the Attorney General
knows or has reasonable ground to believe probably would, after entry, (A)
engage in activities which would be prohibited by laws of the United States
relating to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity subversive
to the national security, (B) engage in any activity a purpose of which is the
opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United
States, by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means, or (C) join, affiliate
with, or participate in the activities of any organization which is registered
under section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.
33. INA § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27). See Internal Security Act of
1950, § 22(1), 64 Stat. at 1006; see also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 30
(1952); S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1653, 1703.
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that foreign policy concerns fall within the expansive language of
section 212(a)(27). Thus, the government may bar noncitizens if
they come from countries or belong to organizations hostile to the
United States if it believes that their'admission would be an embar-
rassment or that such noncitizens would criticize United States for-
eign policy once admitted.34
The State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual indicates exam-
ples of aliens who might be excluded under section 212(a)(27).
These include aliens who conspire against the United States govern-
ment or any foreign government while in the country, a known mem-
ber of a terrorist organization, a person known to be associated with
a criminal organization, or a person who had practiced physical bru-
tality while holding political office or who was associated with a gov-
ernment that practiced such brutality.a5
Aliens who were denied admission based on section 212(a)(27)
criteria include Thomas Borge (1983), Nicaragua's Interior Minis-
ter; Nino Pasti (1984), former member of the Italian senate and re-
tired general of the Italian armed forces and, at present, a member
of the World Peace Council, which is considered by the State De-
partment to be a front for the Soviet Union;36 Olga Finlay and Leo-
nor Rodriguez (1983), members of the Federation of Cuban Women;
and Hortensia Allende (1985), the widow of former Chilean Presi-
dent Salvador Allende Gossens, and also a member of the World
Peace Council. 7 Each of these individuals sought nonimmigrant
visas for the purpose of attending conferences in the United States as
invitees of United States citizens. All belong to organizations or gov-
ernments considered to be hostile to the United States. Further, each
denial of a nonimmigrant visa resulted in litigation, discussed in
greater detail below. More importantly, however, the denial of visas
to these individuals constitutes direct violation of the Helsinki Ac-
cords, provisions relating to the free flow of ideas and persons across
national boundaries regardless of political ideology. 8
34. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 885-86 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated,
785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd per curiam, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
35. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL pt. II, § 41.91(a)(27), reprinted
in 6 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 41.91(a)(23)-(28) [hereinafter
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL] (regulations indicate that consular officers must obtain an
advisory opinion from the State Department before an alien is excluded under this
provision).
36. See Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1048.
37. See Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (D. Mass. 1985).
38. See supra notes 14-16.
Section 212(a)(28)
The most controversial of the three ideological exclusion provisions
is section 212(a)(28).3 ' This provision is the only one for which a
waiver of inadmissibility is available.4 Section 212(a)(28) concerns
itself with the political beliefs and ideology of aliens who want to
enter the United States. The denial of a waiver under this section
ultimately was challenged before the United States Supreme Court.
The decision in that case has been, in turn, the source of much case
law addressing ideological exclusion under immigration and nation-
ality law.4 1
Section 212(a)(28) covers persons who:
1. are anarchists;42
2. advocate or teach opposition to all organized government, or
who are members of or affiliated with organizations opposing organ-
ized government; 43
3. are members of or affiliated with: the Communist Party of the
United States; any communist or totalitarian party in the United
States or anywhere in the world; any section, subsidiary, branch,
subdivision of such organizations; or any predecessors or successors
of such groups in the United States or elsewhere;44
4. are not within other provisions of paragraph (28) who advocate
world communism or the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship
in the United States, or are members of or affliated with any organi-
zation advocating such doctrines, either through its own utterances
or any written or printed publications issued or published with the
permission, consent, authority or funds of such an organization;45
5. are members of or affiliated with any organization subject to
section 7 of the subversive Activities Control Act of 1950;46
6. advocate or teach or belong to any organization that advances
the violent overthrow of the United States government or all forms
of law, or advocate the killing of an official of any government be-
cause of his or her official capacity, and destroy property or commit
39. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28).
40. Id. § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A).
41. See e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
42. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(A).
43. Id. § 1182(a)(28)(B). See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 35, at §
42.91(a)(28)(1.2) (an advocate is a person who advises, recommends, furthers by overt
act, and admits belief in a proscribed doctrine).
44. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(C). See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN-
UAL, supra note 35, at § 42.91(a)(28)(1.1) (a proscribed organization is anyone of the
parent, subsidiary, or affiliate groups that has a Communist affiliation or that advocates
the violent overthrow of the United States government, or the killing of any official of
any organized government, destroys property or commits sabotage).
45. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D).
46. Id. § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(E).
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sabotage;747
7. knowingly write, publish, circulate, distribute, print or display
materials that advocate or teach opposition to organized government,
the violent overthrow of the United States or any organized govern-
ment, and the killing of officials of such government through subver-
sive activities;48
8. are members of or affiliated with organizations that distribute,
circulate, write, publish, print, display or possess any written or
printed materials described in paragraph 7 above. 9
Except with regard to anarchists, section 212(a)(28) has an escape
clause. If a person can convince the consular officer at the time of
visa application that membership in or affiliation with the proscribed
organizations or doctrines ended before his or her sixteenth birthday,
or occurred involuntarily, by operation of law, or to obtain employ-
ment, food rations, or other essentials of living, he or she may be
admitted.50 In addition, the consular officer may grant admission if
the person had terminated the affiliation or membership at least five
years before applying for the visa, and has since been in active oppo-
sition to the proscribed doctrine or organization.5 1 The State Depart-
ment has interpreted active opposition to include overt actions, like
delivering speeches and writing articles or essays, as well as various
covert activities. 2 Further, the Attorney General may admit an alien
if it is determined to be in the public interest of the United States to
do so.53
On its face, section 212(a)(28) is at odds with Basket III provi-
sions of the Helsinki Accords. In an action that would seem, at the
very least, to be a tacit admission that the immigration laws of the
47. Id. § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F). The State Department inter-
prets this section as authorizing control over terrorism, which is not defined in the Act.
See 1987 Hearing, supra note 18, at 36-37; T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 3,
at 201-02.
48. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G).
49. Id. § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(H). See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN-
UAL, supra note 35, at § 42.91(a)(28)(1.3) (affiliation is interpreted as the giving, loan-
ing, or promising of support or money or any other thing of value to a proscribed organi-
zation; some type of positive action is needed, mere intellectual curiosity is insufficient; if
facts indicate an affiliation with a proscribed organization the State Department will
conduct an investigation).
50. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(I)(i).
51. Id. § 212(a)(28)(I)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(I)(ii).
52. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 41.91(a)(28)(vii).
53. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(28)(I)(ii)(b) (the Attorney General
must submit a detailed report to Congress for each alien who is admitted under this
section).
United States conflict with its obligations under the Accords, Con-
gress passed the McGovern Amendment in 1977.1" The law was en-
acted "[f]or purposes of achieving greater United States compliance
with the provisions of the Final Act. . . ."r, At the time, Congress
was concerned about the compliance of other countries and thus set
the United States as the exemplar of international conduct under the
Accords. 6
The McGovern Amendment provides for waiver of excludability in
individual cases unless the security interests of the United States
would be threatened by admitting the applicant in question. Within
thirty days of receiving an application for a nonimmigrant visa from
an applicant who is otherwise eligible for admission, except for ex-
cludability under section 212(a)(28), the Amendment indicates that
the Secretary of State should recommend to the Attorney General
that the exclusion be waived unless the Secretary of State finds that
admission would threaten security interests of the United States.5 7
The McGovern Amendment, however, does not apply to representa-
tives of labor organizations who are considered agents of a totalitar-
ian state5 and anyone connected with the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization. 9 The Amendment further recommends that the
Secretary of State refuse waivers to persons coming from countries
that are not in substantial compliance with the Accords, especially
Basket 111.60
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State
Department have streamlined the procedure for granting waivers
under the McGovern Amendment. They have transferred the au-
54. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (as amended Aug. 15, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-60, tit. 1, §
109, 93 Stat. 397).
55. See 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a). But see Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1979 Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 126(a), 92 Stat. 963 (as amended Nov. 22, 1983, Pub.
L. No. 98-164, tit. X § 1011(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1061. Although Congress has expressed its
desire to have the United States comply with the Basket III provisions of the Accords
(lowering international travel barriers in order to facilitate a greater exchange of persons
and ideas), it did make a reservation of reciprocity. The United States should impose
travel restrictions only against the citizens of foreign countries that impose travel restric-
tions against United States citizens traveling within the particular foreign country. See
also H.R. REP. No. 1160, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo.
& ADMIN. N.ws 2486.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1160, supra note 55, at 45; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 537,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 30-31, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1660-
61 [hereinafter REP. No. 537].
57. Legislative history supports the statutory interpretation that the McGovern
Amendment creates a presumption of waiver: "[t]he conference substitute provides that
...the Secretary of State ...should recommend that the Attorney General grant
approval . . . unless . . . the admission of such alien be contrary to the security interests
of the United States." REP. No. 537, supra note 56, at 1661.
58. See 22 U.S.C. § 2691(b).
59. Id. § 2691(c).
60. Id. § 2691(d).
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thority to grant waivers to consular officers. Previously, only the At-
torney General's designate, the district director, had the power to
grant waivers upon a recommendation from the Secretary of State.
This new arrangement applies only to section 212(a)(28)(C) of the
INA.6'
A number of well-known cultural and political figures have been
denied visas under section 212(a)(28), including Latin American lit-
erary figures Carlos Fuentes, 2 Gabriel Garcia Marquez,6 3 Julio
Cortazar,64 Ernesto Sabato,6 5 Angel Rama,6 as well as the Italian
playwright, Dario Fo, and his wife, Franca Rama. 7 Mr. Fo and his
wife were denied visas even though the State Department indicated
that it never believed that they would "foment revolution or throw
bombs" while in the United States."8 The purpose of their trip was to
participate in a drama festival cosponsored by New York University
and the Italian government.6 9 The State Department finally gave
them visas in 1984 after denials in 1980 and 1983. A number of
political figures have been denied nonimmigrant visas under section
212(a)(28) as well. These include Bernadette Delvin, former mem-
ber of the British Parliament,70 Robert D'Aubussion, leader of El
Salvador's ARENA party,7 1 and hundreds of delegates from Japan
and other countries who attempted to attend a United Nations con-
ference on disarmament in 1982.2
61. See 51 Fed. Reg. 32,294-96 (Sept. 10, 1986); see supra note 44 (members of
proscribed organizations).
62. Mexican scholar, author, Robert F. Kennedy Professor of Latin American
Studies at Harvard University until 1989; see FREE TRADE IN IDEAS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVE (1985) (proceedings of Conference held Sept. 18, 1984, at Washington,
D.C.) [hereinafter FREE TRADE IN IDEAS].
63. Columbian author, recipient of the 1982 Nobel Prize in Literature. Garcia
Marquez has been both denied and granted nonimmigrant visas since 1960; see FREE
TRADE IN IDEAS, supra note 62, at 71-74.
64. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 107.
65. See FREE TRADE IN IDEAS, supra note 62, at 66.
66. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 108.
67. See FREE TRADE IN IDEAS, supra note 62, at 66.
68. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 107; see also Tanner, Satirist is Hurt by
Absurdities of Life in Italy, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1980, at 17, col. 1.
69. See FREE TRADE IN IDEAS, supra note 62, at 91-100; see also Munk, Cross
Left, The Village Voice, June 2, 1980, at 86, col. 1.
70. Richter & Warnow, Do Not Enter: Visa War Against Ideas 5, 10 (1986)
(transcript from film made for public broadcasting on file with the author). Other Irish
excluded are Ian Paisley and Danny Morrison. Mr. Morrison came illegally after the
denial of his visa; he was apprehended and incarcerated for a week before he was de-
ported back to Ireland. Two years later he returned to stand trial and was granted a visa.
71. Id. at 11.
72. Id. at 6. See, e.g., NGO Comm. on Disarmament v. Haig, 697 F.2d 294 (2d
In sum, denial of visas to these people was based on general for-
eign policy concerns rather than on any perceived danger to national
security of the United States. These exclusions have affected people
from both ends of the political spectrum. The denials of visas under
both sections 212(a)(27) and (28) have resulted in recent litigation
in the federal courts.
JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS
The general rule on judicial review of immigration decisions to
exclude noncitizens from the United States is that Congress has ple-
nary power to condition entry of those seeking to enter the country.
As implemented or enforced by the executive branch, this power is
not subject to judicial review.73 The power of Congress to exclude
aliens is not enumerated in the Constitution. Rather, it derives from
the inherent powers of sovereignty reflected in both domestic and
international law. 4
Congress may exclude aliens who pose a threat to national secur-
ity, who participate in certain types of political activities, and even
those who espouse political opinions which otherwise would be pro-
tected by constitutional guarantees.7 5 There are no due process limi-
tations on such congressional actions. In Galvan v. Press,7 6 the Su-
preme Court reviewed due process issues associated with deportation
proceedings involving a noncitizen who was "duped into joining the
Communist Party. 77 The Court stated:
[M]uch could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that
the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore
recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation
of aliens . . . . [B]ut the slate is not clean . . . . [T]he formulation of
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress . . . [T]his has become
about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body
politic as any aspect of our government.78
As a result of this doctrine, aliens who are denied admission to the
United States based on any of the ideological exclusion grounds set
out in section 212(a) of the INA have no standing to sue, and courts
lack subject matter jurisdiction to review such exclusions.
Cir. 1982).
73. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1899); see also Lem Moon
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651 (1892).
74. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304, 318-22
(1936).
75. See generally Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (exclusion process does not deprive
the alien of any rights, even if the exclusion was based on confidential information that if
disclosed would be prejudicial to the public interest).
76. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
77. Id. at 530.
78. Id. at 530-31.
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Although aliens may lack standing to challenge section 212(a) ex-
clusions in the courts, the same is not necessarily true for United
States citizens. In the course of the past decade, United States citi-
zens have asserted successfully that they do have such standing
based on their first amendment rights to receive information. In an
area long closed to judicial review, this particular development has
created significant case law with respect to ideological exclusion
under immigration laws.79
The leading first amendment Supreme Court case focusing upon
alien exclusion is Kleindienst v. Mandel. 0 Ernest Mandel, a Belgian
Marxist economist, was denied a nonimmigrant visa in 1969. Mr.
Mandel had planned to attend a conference at Stanford University
and to speak with faculty members from various universities and or-
ganizations located in Cambridge, Massachusetts and New York
City."' Mr. Mandel twice previously had been allowed to enter the
United States for similar activities. Both times he was granted a
waiver of excludability pursuant to section 212(d)(3) of the Act. 2
Restrictions had been placed upon his activities during his past visits,
which he had ignored. As a result, his next application was denied
under subsections 212(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v), which preclude entry
of noncitizens who advocate or teach world communism. 83 Mr.
Mandel was forced to give his talk by telephone.
Soon thereafter, Mr. Mandel and the United States citizens who
had invited him filed an action in federal district court against the
government, asserting that their first amendment rights had been vi-
olated.8' The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' first amendment
argument.8 5 At the district court level, the government had con-
tended that neither the United States citizen plaintiffs nor Mr.
79. See, e.g., Kleindienst, 408 U.S. 753; NGO Comm. on Disarmament, 697 F.2d
294; Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1986), affd, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987); Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass.
1985).
80. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
81. Id. at 756-57.
82. Id. at 756.
83. Id. at 757-59.
84. Id. at 759-60. See Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1968) (freedom of expression involves the right to receive information and ideas).
85. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765 (the government put forth two arguments: that
there was no restriction on the plaintiff's first amendment rights since what was re-
stricted was "action," and that the first amendment did not apply because technological
developments in communications such as telephones had supplanted the necessity for Mr.
Mandel's physical presence in the United States).
Mandel had standing to sue. The district court rejected the govern-
ment's argument, holding that Mr. Mandel and those who invited
him had standing.8 6 The Supreme Court did not address the stand-
ing issue; nor did the Court address the question of subject matter
jurisdiction. Significantly, the Court did not appear to be troubled by
the question. In a six to three decision the Court held that the Attor-
ney General had exercised properly his power to deny the waiver,
especially in light of Mr. Mandel's failure to abide by prior entry
conditions:
[W]hen the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a
facially legitimate and bonafide reason, the courts will neither look behind
the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification
against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal commu-
nication with the applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds may
be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification
whatever is advanced is a question we neither address nor decide in this
case.
8 7
Thus, although the Court let stand the district court's determination
regarding standing, it established the minimal standard of reasona-
bleness for judicial review of decisions to deny a waiver.
In Abourezk v. Reagan,"8 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit decided a case involving similar issues. In
Abourezk, United States citizens invited Thomas Borge, Interior
Minister of Nicaragua, Olga Finlay and Leonor Lezcano Rodriguez,
both members of the Federation of Cuban Women, and Nino Pasti
to participate in various speaking activities throughout the country.
Nonimmigrant visas were denied to all four pursuant to section
212(a)(27) of the INA. Three different cases originally were filed,
later consolidated at the appellate level. 89
The United States citizens placed three arguments before the
court. First, they claimed that section 212(a)(27) does not authorize
the government to deny visas because of foreign policy concerns.
Rather, the law speaks to issues of "public interest or . . . welfare
• . . or security." 90 The court found it to be consistent with the con-
gressional intent underlying the statute to review foreign policy con-
cerns as a sufficient national interest to warrant protection through
the exclusion of aliens."1 The plaintiffs also argued that section
212(a)(27) covers only "activities" and not the mere entry or pres-
ence of aliens. The court agreed, concluding that the word "activi-
86. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. at 631-32.
87. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added).
88. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1986) (per curiam).
89. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1047.
90. Id. at 1062.
91. Id. at 1053 (statutory interpretation is accomplished by first examining the
law's plain meaning, then by ascertaining congressional intent); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc,
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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ties" would be superfluous and misleading if aliens could be excluded
based on mere entry or presence. 2 Since the legislative history was
ambiguous on this question, the court remanded the issue to the dis-
trict court for a clarification of congressional intent.93 Finally, plain-
tiffs argued that the government had used section 212(a)(27) to by-
pass the McGovern Amendment's limitation on section 212(a)(28).
The court explicitly stated that the government may not use section
212(a) (27) to "swallow-up" section 212(a) (28) or, more specifically,
circumvent the McGovern Amendment by excluding an alien who is
otherwise admissible to the United States because of his or her affili-
ation with a proscribed organization:94
[W]hen an alien is a member of a proscribed organization, so that subsec-
tion (28) applies, the government may bypass that provision and proceed
under subsection (27) only if the reason for the threat to the "public inter-
est[,] . . . welfare, safety, or security" is independent of the fact of mem-
bership in or affiliation with the proscribed organization.
95
The court faulted the government for not having developed criteria
or standards for identifying threats as distinct from membership.96
As to the constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs concerning
their first amendment rights, the court did not express an opinion.
7
92. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1054.
93. Id. at 1056.
94. Id. at 1056-58 (the court stated that to exclude aliens on account of their
perceived political bent or proclivities with respect to proscribed organizations contra-
venes the congressional intent expressed in the McGovern Amendment, which was in-
tended to fulfill the United States' pledge pursuant to the Accords to promote the free
flow of ideas and people across national boundaries).
95. Id. at 1058 (emphasis added).
96. The Abourezk case was remanded to the district court to determine Congress'
intent concerning "activities" as opposed to mere presence or entry. Further, the govern-
ment was instructed to come up with appropriate guidelines for determining if a section
212(a)(27) threat was independent of membership in a proscribed organization, in which
case section 212(a)(28) would apply. Id.
97. Id. at 1060 n.24. Abourezk's only dissent was by Judge Bork. Although he
agreed with the majority's findings that the court had jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs
had standing, he disagreed with the statutory analysis the majority used to reach its
holding. First, the dissenting opinion enunciated the principle that courts should defer to
the Executive's reasonable interpretation of the INA's exclusion provisions, especially in
light of the assertion that the Executive is the "sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations" and does not require an act of Congress to implement
its authority in that area. Id. at 1063 (Bork, J., dissenting opinion).
Judge Bork then stated that subsection (27) of the Act preserves in the Executive
broad power to exclude persons from the United States. Id. at 1064. After examining the
legislative history, he concluded that since Congress meant "activities" to encompass
both entry and presence, there was no need to remand the case for further clarification of
congressional intent. Id. at 1066. Next, Judge Bork stated his belief that the McGovern
Amendment did not apply to the instant case, and thus no danger existed that subsection
(28) would be subsumed by subsection (27). Therefore, the dissent argued, the majority's
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court decision
by a three to three vote. 8 The equally divided court did not write an
opinion, and issued its decision per curiam.99 Although Abourezk
does not set national precedent, it is controlling in the District of
Columbia Circuit.
In Allende v. Schultz,100 a federal district court adopted the stan-
dard suggested by Abourezk. Hortensia Allende applied for a non-
immigrant visa in Mexico City. The purpose of her planned trip was
to speak with various scholars, politicians, and religious leaders who
had invited her to the United States. The visa application was denied
pursuant to section 212(a)(28)(C).' 0' Because the McGovern
Amendment came into play, the consular officer in Mexico City re-
quested an advisory opinion from the State Department headquar-
ters in Washington, D.C. The advisory opinion reaffirmed the origi-
nal decision and further determined that Mrs. Allende was ineligible
to receive a visa under section 212(a)(27) as well, for which there is
no waiver of inadmissibility.0 2 Accordingly, the consular officer re-
turned Mrs. Allende's passport and informed her that the visa was
denied under section 212(a)(27).
Soon thereafter, the United States citizens who had extended invi-
tations to Mrs. Allende initiated action against the visa denial on the
ground that their first amendment rights had been violated. The gov-
ernment moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the plaintiffs had
no standing to sue, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
argument that exclusion under subsection (27) must be independent of subsection (28)
was incorrect. Id. at 1069-70. In Bork's view, the McGovern Amendment should be in-
terpreted narrowly: "[it] sought to end the statutory policy of excluding all members of
subsection (28) organizations automatically, where there was nothing more than the fact
of membership as the basis" for exclusion. Id. at 1072.
Unlike the majority, Bork specifically answered the constitutional challenge of the
plaintiffs. He rejected their first amendment challenge because it would, in effect, dimin-
ish the Executive's power to conduct foreign policy. By analogy, the dissent stated that
preventing United States citizens from traveling to a foreign country (Cuba) "is certainly
not less serious constitutionally than preventing that country's citizens from coming to
the United States." Id. at 1075 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1964) (upholding the
prevention of international travel)). Bork concluded his dissent by postulating that the
Abourezk majority is cautiously beginning a process of "judicial incursion into the U.S.'s
conduct of foreign affairs." Id. at 1076.
98. Abourezk, 108 S. Ct. 252 (per curiam) (Justice Blackmun did not vote be-
cause a former law clerk was a party in the case; Justice Scalia recused himself because
earlier he had voted on the government's request for the full appeals court to rehear the
case). See also Kamen, Court Upholds Curb on Visa Denials, Wash. Post, Oct. 20,
1987, at A9, col. 4.
99. For a discussion of oral argument before the court, see 64 INTERPRETER Rn-
LEASES 1149-50 (Oct. 9, 1987).
100. 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985).
101. Id. at 1222.
102. Id.
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granted.10 3 Since the last argument was related to the first two, the
court decided only the issues of standing and jurisdiction.
The court denied the government's motion to dismiss, finding that
plaintiffs had standing. Furthermore, although it recognized that a
narrow standard of review applied in the field of immigration and
naturalization, the court found jurisdiction because fundamental
rights of United States citizens were affected.104 The government
then moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had "legally ade-
quate reasons" for refusing the visa. These reasons related to infor-
mation contained in classified affidavits indicating that Mrs. Allende
was a member of two proscribed organizations, both affiliated with
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and her presence in the
country would be "prejudicial to the conduct of foreign affairs of the
United States." 105
The court found that affiliation with these organizations was not,
in itself, a facially legitimate and bona fide reason to exclude Mrs.
Allende under section 212(a)(27). Instead, the court held that she
should be excluded under section 212(a)(28).106 In addition, the
court found the claim of prejudice to the conduct of foreign affairs
"entirely conclusive" and inadequate. The court believed that the
reason for denying Mrs. Allende the nonimmigrant visa was because
the government did not agree with or was afraid of what she might
say once admitted to the United States. The planned "activities"
were protected speech and association; thus, the government could
not deny entry under section 212(2)(27) "solely on account of the
content of speech. 10 7 The unclassified materials were rejected and
summary judgment was denied, without prejudice, leaving the gov-
ernment free to establish a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason"
to refuse the visa, if it could.108
103. Id. at 1222-23.
104. Id. at 1223. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977) (the govern-
ment's political power in this area is not completely immune from judicial review).
105. Allende, 605 F. Supp. at 1224 (citing affidavit of Under Secretary of State,
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, at para. 12; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Louis P.
Goeltz, at para. 17).
106. Id. at 1225.
107. Id. at 1226. See, e.g., Bane v. Spencer, 393 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970) (summary judgment may not be granted on materials to
which the opposing counsel does not have access). Compare El-Werfalli v. Smith, 547 F.
Supp. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (government provided the court with information for in
camera inspection with regard to classified documents that served as a legitimate reason-
able basis for exclusion).
108. Allende, 605 F. Supp. at 1226; see also Harvard Law School Forum v. Sch-
ultz, 633 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (D. Mass. 1986) (discretionary denial of travel permit
The parties renewed cross-motions for summary judgment before
the district court in March 1987.19 The government declassified
parts of the previously classified materials. In support of its motion,
the government argued that Mrs. Allende is an active member of the
World Peace Council, considered by the State Department to be an
instrument of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Further, the govern-
ment contended, it is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to seek
unilateral Western disarmament by covertly manipulating United
States public opinion through such organizations as the World Peace
Council. Because of the delicate relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union, activities involving the World Peace Council
are contrary to the United States' interests. Beginning in 1982, the
Executive implemented a policy of refusing entry to aliens who are
members of the organization. 110
In addition to her activities in the World Peace Council, Mrs. Al-
lende participated in three international conferences between 1977
and 1981, during which she criticized the United States, spoke in
support of women's issues, and called for disarmament. According to
the government, participation in these conferences was a legitimate
and bona fide reason independent of her membership in the World
Peace Council to warrant denial of her visa under section 212(a)(27)
of the INA."1
The district court found that Mrs. Allende fit squarely in section
212(a)(28) of the exclusion provisions of the INA and that her par-
ticipation in the international conferences was incidental to, and not
separate from, her membership in the World Peace Council. Thus,
the government had no lawful basis for proceeding under section
212(a)(27) of the Act; rather, it should have used section
212(a)(28). In any event, the government failed to establish a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason to waive admission in eligi-
bility under section 212(a)(28)'s McGovern Amendment.1 1 2
Abourezk and Allende are the major cases building upon the
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason" standard that was postu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Kleindienst. If the Executive is to
deny a nonimmigrant visa on one of the ideological exclusion
grounds set out in section 212(a), its reason for doing so must be
consistent with congressional intent, especially when the denial is
under section 212(a)(28)(F) to member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's
(PLO) United Nations Observer Mission, based on the foreign policy ground of not af-
fording official recognition to PLO was not facially legitimate; such denial was "directly
related to the suppression of a political debate with American citizens").
109. Allende, No. 83-3984-CL (D. Mass., Mar. 31, 1987).
110. Id. at 8. (declassified affidavit of Under Secretary of State, Lawrence S.
Eagleburger, at 3-8).
111. Id. at9.
112. Id. at 13.
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based on membership or affiliation with an organization proscribed
by section 212(a)(28). Legislative intent under this section brings
the McGovern Amendment into play with its corresponding pre-
sumption of waiver. The Executive may use section 212(a)(27) only
if the excluded alien does not fall under any of the other exclusion-
ary provisions. It may not use section 212(a)(27) to circumvent the
McGovern Amendment, and if the noncitizen is excludable under
both categories, section 212(a)(27) must be an independent ground
apart from mere membership in a proscribed organization. In addi-
tion, the reason for denying the visa must be content-neutral, with
due regard for the first amendment rights of protected speech and
association of United States citizens who are affected by a denial.
AMENDING THE IDEOLOGICAL ExCLUSION PROVISIONS
Rationale for Change
Critics of the ideological exclusion provisions have stated a num-
ber of reasons why the present law should be amended. First, the
statutory language reflects a period in American history character-
ized by anticommunist hysteria.113 The spirit of the McCarthy pe-
riod is present in "xenophobic legislation. . . whose guiding emotion
was fear . . . that the wrong people would get into the country and
overwhelm and or subvert us."1"4 Furthermore, the ideological exclu-
sion provisions of United States immigration law clearly undermine
American democracy abroad. Foreign critics of the present law
waste no time in pointing out that the United States is the only
Western democracy that uses political tests for the issuance of
visas. 1 5 American citizens who visit most countries in Western Eu-
rope need only show their passports to enter.1 6
113. J. Edgar Hoover, late Director of the FBI, perhaps best expressed this senti-
ment when he said that "[c]ommunism in reality is not a political party. It is a way of
life. It reveals a condition akin to disease that spreads like an epidemic, a quarantine is
necessary from infecting this nation," reprinted in Richter & Warnow, supra note 70, at
4; see also Turned Back in Toronto, Wash. Post, Apr. 29, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
114. Why Fear Foreigners' Free Speech?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1986, at A30, col.
1; 1987 Hearing, supra note 18, at 128 ("when the [INA] was passed in 1952 some
thought that the only way to save freedom was by restricting it") (statement of Steny H.
Hoyer).
115. 1987 Hearing, supra note 18, at 128 (ideological restrictions of the INA are
an international embarassment, and philosophically and intellectually unjustifiable)
(statement of Steny H. Hoyer); id. at 292 ("the reputation of the United States, a coun-
try known around the world for its commitment to free speech, can only be diminished")
(written testimony of Center for Constitutional Rights).
116. Id. at 125 (the INA is a "splinter in our eye, and other Helsinki signatories
At home, the restrictions on admission are criticized because they
curtail the first amendment rights of United States citizens. Some
members of the Supreme Court have agreed with this contention.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting from the majority opinion
in Kleindienst,117 stated that the United States government had no
compelling interest for preempting the first amendment rights of
those citizens who wanted to hear Mr. Mandel in person. 118 They
stated further that keeping controversial ideas out of the country is
not a governmental concern comparable to national security, public
health, or law enforcement." 9 The Justices distinguished the prece-
dents established in a long line of exclusion cases from the situation
in Kleindienst: none of the other cases involved first amendment
rights of United States citizens. 20 Justice Douglas also dissented
from the majority in Kleindienst. He distinguished the other exclu-
sion cases based on the role of ideological considerations in the ex-
clusion of Mandel: Congress never intended to give the Attorney
General the power to "pick and choose" among ideologies of aliens
who wish to lecture in the United States.' 2' Certain members of
Congress agree: "We have inherited a statutory scheme which really
puts the government in a position of deciding what is and is not fit
for the American people to hear, and read, and talk about."' 22
Critics also have indicated that the actual statutory language is
very broad in scope and vague in content. 23 The Attorney General
and consular officials may deny visas to an alien who seeks "to en-
gage in activities ... prejudicial to the public interest" or who
would engage in activities upon entering that are "subversive to the
national security.' 24 Most sweeping of all, the eight paragraphs of
section 212(a)(28) cover all noncitizens who are or were members of
affiliates of Communist or anarchist groups.'25 In reality, the Mc-
Govern Amendment has made most of section 212(a)(28) anachro-
nistic since out of 45,900 visas denied under this section in 1986,
try to make it a beam") (statement of Steny H. Hoyer); 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at
147 (statement of Jeri Leber, Executive Director, Helsinki Watch Committee). See also
1987 Hearing, supra note 18, at 220 (statement of Morton Halperin, Director, Center
for National Security Studies, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
117. See 408 U.S. 754, 774 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 779.
119. Id. at 783.
120. Id. at 782.
121. Id. at 774 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122. 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 47 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, D-
Mass.). See also 1987 Hearing, supra note 18, at 129 (statement of Steny H. Hoyer).
123. 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 103 (statement of Arthur Helton on behalf
of the Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Bar of the City of New
York, which sponsored a report advocating amending the ideological exclusion grounds,
entitled Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update (1984)).
124. 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 103-04.
125. Id.
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45,300 were waived.1 26 At the very least, if the ideological exclusion
provisions are retained, they can only be administered in a consist-
ently fair manner if they are better defined and simplified. x2
More important than administrative vagaries, however, is the fact
that the ideological exclusion provisions violate international agree-
ments to which the United States is a signatory. Specifically, these
provisions are not consistent with the United States' obligation to
facilitate international travel and encourage the free flow of ideas
across national boundaries.1 2 Curiously, the McGovern Amend-
ment, which was designed to bring the United States into greater
compliance with the Helsinki Accords, has had the effect of compli-
cating the visa process. Having to obtain a waiver of inadmissibility
does little to diminish the humiliation many international cultural
and political leaders feel as a result of the entire visa process. 129
Proposed Changes
In recent years, changes to the ideological exclusion grounds have
been proposed. Since 1983, three similar bills have been introduced
into Congress.130 In 1983 and 1987, the Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion, Refugees, and International Law of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee held hearings on proposed changes to the exclusion and de-
portation provisions of the INA. 3' In the Senate, Senator Daniel
Moynihan (D-N.Y.) introduced legislation which would revise the
exclusion grounds of the INA. x1
2
126. 1987 Hearing, supra note 18, at 129.
127. See generally Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1975) (suggests that a complete revision of section 212 is highly
desirable).
128. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 142-48; Remnick, At PEN Taking on
the Write Wing, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1986, at DI, col. 4 (statement by E.L. Doctorow,
stressing that universal freedom of expression is of critical importance to the interna-
tional community of writers).
129. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 30, at 136-37 (statement of William Styron,
American author, on behalf of PEN American Center).
130. H.R. 4509, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 18, 1983); H.R. 5227, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Mar. 22, 1984); H.R. 1119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 18, 1987).
131. See generally 1987 Hearing, supra note 18; 1983 Hearing, supra note 30.
132. H.R. 1119, supra note 130. The Senate revision would eliminate section
212(a)(28), and retain sections 212(a)(27) and (29). Section 212(a)(29) would be
redesignated section 212(a)(28). According to this revision, if the Attorney General de-
termines that a particular person is excludable under either of the above sections, he
must consult with the Secretary of State. A denial of the visa would be reviewed by a
court established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-11 (1982), which would affirm the decision or instruct the Secretary of State to
grant the visa and the Attorney General to admit the alien. S. 28, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
Most recently, Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) intro-
duced a bill, H.R. 1119, that contained several significant changes to
the ideological exclusion provisions. 133 Section 212(a)(3) of the bill,
which would replace sections 212(a)(27), (28) and (29) of the INA,
sets out the criteria for determining whether to exclude certain aliens
on political and public safety grounds:
(3) SECURITY GROUNDS - Any alien who a consular officer or the At-
torney General knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, is likely to en-
gage after entry in -
(A) any activity proscribed by the laws of the United States relating to
espionage or sabotage,(B) any other criminal activity which endangers public safety or national
security,
(C) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control...
of, the government, or of the United States by force, violence, or other un-
constitutional means or
(D) any terrorist activity is excludable.13'
The proposed bill clearly represents an attempt to focus on spe-
cific, actual threats to national security, much as does section
212(a)(29) of the present law. 35 However, it departs markedly from
present law by completely eliminating exclusion based on public in-
terest considerations and membership or affiliation with Communist
or anarchist groups.13 6 In addition, the proposed bill defines terrorist
activities as "[o]rganizing, abetting, or participating in a wanton or
indiscriminate act of violence with extreme indifference to the risk of
causing death or serious bodily injury to individuals not taking part
in armed hostilities."'M3 Once again, the emphasis is on specific acts,
not belief or affiliation. In this regard, the proposed legislation brings
United States immigration law into greater conformance with the
provisions of the Helsinki Accords pertaining to greater exchange of
ideas and persons across national boundaries.138
(1987).
133. H.R. 1119, supra note 130. See Greenhouse, House Gets A Bill to Ease Visa
Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at B6, col. 6. Representative Peter Rodino (D-N.J.)
also has introduced a bill at the request of the State Department, which would amend
various exclusion grounds of the INA, including ideological exclusions. H.R. 3293, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See also infra note 138 (statement by Abraham Sofaer, Dep't of
State Legal Advisor).
134. H.R. 1119, supra note 130, § 212(a)(3).
135. See INA § 212(a)(29), 38 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2 9).
136. See supra note 33; see INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28).
137. H.R. 1119, supra note 130, § 2(a)(D). This definition would be added to 8
U.S.C. § 101(a) as subsection (43).
138. The Reagan Administration generally supports H.R. 1119 in order to bring
the INA into "modern reality." It does not object to the elimination of the exclusion
grounds solely on the membership or affiliation with a proscribed organization or doc-
trine. The Administration would retain section 212(a)(28)(F) because it is used to con-
trol terrorism. Any replacement of this provision would need to provide assurances
against possible export of technological information, national security interests, and intel-
ligence information. Moreover, the Administration would like to retain a waiver of exclu-
sion and impose conditions, if necessary, to visas waived under this section. Further, the
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The definition of "terrorist activities" in H.R. 1119 includes sub-
stance and jurisdiction elements, but lacks a clear element of intent.
Thus, there is no requirement that there be proof of the purpose (in-
tent) for which the terrorist activity is committed. As such, this defi-
nition is overbroad in that it potentially covers conduct not consid-
ered "terrorist" under existing federal law.139 If one purpose of this
legislation is to give clarity to the definition of terrorism, 140 the defi-
nition of "terrorist activities" should, at the very least, be consistent
with other federal law in this area.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Even a cursory review of the ideological exclusion provisions of the
INA reveals the significant gap that exists between those provisions
and the principles expressed in the Helsinki Accords. 4 ' The present
provisions inhibit rather than foster greater international travel and
free exchange of ideas across national boundaries.'42 Although there
Administration opposes the elimination of section 212(a)(27)'s standard of "prejudicial
to the public interest" because it is needed for foreign policy considerations. However,
the Administration would accept language to limit exclusion to those instances which
"implicate serious foreign policy considerations." See generally 1987 Hearing, supra
note 18, at 34-43 (statement of Abraham Sofaer, Dep't of State Legal Advisor), 44-45,
47 (Alan Nelson, INS Comm'r; John Bolton, Assistant Att'y General), 54-58 (Alan Nel-
son, INA Comm'r). See also supra note 133 (H.R. 3293 introduced to Congress repre-
senting the Administration's amendments to INA).
139. Congress already has expressed its concern about such a possibility in regard
to the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act which contains the same
inductive approach in defining terrorist actions as H.R. 1119:
[T]he committee of conference does not intend that chapter 113A reach
nonterrorist violence inflicted upon American victims. Simple barroom brawls
or normal street crime, for example, are not intended to be covered by this
provision. To ensure that this statute is used only for its intended purpose, the
conference substitute requires that the Attorney General certify that in his
judgment such offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a
government or civilian population.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE & ADMIN.
NEWS 1959, 1960 [hereinafter REP. No. 783].
140. See Levitt, Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 97
(1986); Falvey, Legislative Responses to International Terrorism: International and Na-
tional Efforts to Deter and Punish Terrorists, 9 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 323 (1986);
Korblum & Jachnycky, Politics, the Courts and Terrorism: Are The Laws Adequate? 26
JUDGE'S J. 16, 21 (Winter 1987); Larshan, Extradition, The Political Offense Exception
and Terrorism: An Overview of the Three Principal Theories of Law, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J.
231, 234 (1986).
141. See 1987 Hearing, supra note 18, at 325-31 (statement of Int'l Human
Rights Law Group).
142. Other international agreements that conflict with the ideological exclusion
provisions of the INA include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, 3
U.N. GAOR 1, 71 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), and its counterpart, The International
have been attempts in Congress to bring United States domestic law
into greater conformance with the Helsinki Accords, the only signifi-
cant success has been the passage of the McGovern Amendment1 43
in 1977. The visa application process has been used to circumvent
the McGovern Amendment by basing exclusion on provisions that
are not subject to the McGovern Amendment's presumption of
waiver. In addition, the McGovern Amendment itself is something of
a mixed blessing, since it has the effect of complicating, rather than
simplifying, exit and entry procedures, contrary to the obligation on
the part of signatories of the Accords.
Because of traditional judicial review doctrines, United States
courts have been reluctant to scrutinize government action in this
area of immigration law, and because the federal government has
plenary power to control entry into United States territory, aliens
excluded on ideological grounds are not entitled to any constitutional
guarantees.
In recent years, United States citizens have persuaded the courts
to recognize that they, as citizens, do have standing on first amend-
ment grounds to challenge government actions in this area. However,
efforts by United States citizens to have courts review governmental
infringement on their first amendment rights to associate and receive
information because of a denial of an immigrant visa for permanent
residency, and possible deportation of persons whose writing and
teachings advocate proscribed doctrines, have been unsuccessful.' 4'
The Helsinki Accords arose during the period in which there was
a thaw in the cold war between the United States and the Soviet
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression
without political interference and to receive and impart information and ideas through
any media regardless of frontiers); Charter of the Organization of American States, art.
31, 119 U.S.T. 39, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 (1951) (member states undertake to facilitate free
cultural interchange by every medium of expression).
143. 22 U.S.C. § 2691.
144. In Randall v. Meese, C.A. No. 85-3415 n.5 (D.D.C. 1987), the district court
refused to decide questions related to first amendment rights of United States citizens.
Its focus was on the INS action against the alien plaintiff, Margaret Jo Randall, which
denied her application for adjustment of status to become a lawful permanent resident of
the United States (Randall lost her United States citizenship earlier while in Mexico)
because she was statutorily ineligible. The government found Randall ineligible for an
immigrant visa because she came under the purview of section 212(a)(28)(G)(v) of the
Act. As to the first amendment allegations of the United States citizen plaintiffs, the
court stated:
[i]nsofar as plaintiffs allege that their right to association with Randall's ideas
would be affected by her deportation they go beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court. That Randall may be deported and thereby will not share ideas with
citizens of this country because of her physical absence is a consequence of
deportation and not reviewable by this Court. Additionally, any pattern or
practice of the INS to curtail information by denying visas is also not applica-
ble to the matters before this Court.
Id.
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Union. Unfortunately, that spirit of international cooperation is not
quite as evident today. Nevertheless, there is good reason to antici-
pate movement in Congress toward a much needed overhaul of the
entire body of exclusion and deportation laws.
The law should be amended to eliminate mere membership in
Communist or anarchist groups as a ground for exclusion, and to
eliminate the broad "public interest" language which provides the
Executive authority to exclude noncitizens who simply do not agree
with the foreign policy stance of the administration in power. Con-
gress should carefully review efforts by the Executive to retain sec-
tion 212(a)(27) by substituting the present language with linguistic
changes that do not remove foreign policy considerations from the
visa process.145 Only aliens who are likely to engage, after entry, in
activities that pose a direct threat to the national security of the
United States ought to be excluded. The Accords recognize that any
lessening of travel restrictions would need to take security restric-
tions into considerations. 4 e
Further, any legislation that adds a new ground for exclusion
based on terrorism should take into consideration existing interna-
tional and domestic law defining, or at least relating to, terrorism. 47
145. See supra note 138.
146. See Final Act, supra note 1, at 470.8 ("to ease regulations concerning move-
ment of citizens from other participating states to their territory, with due regard to
security requirements").
147. International law has approached the problem of terrorism through the crea-
tion of various international instruments that prohibit specific acts:
(a) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (aircraft hijacking);
(b) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570;
(c) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S.
No. 8532 (diplomatic protection);
(d) Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1457
(1979);
(e) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1419 (1979) (nuclear sabotage);
(f) Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
See also European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 15 I.L.M. 1272(1976), reprinted in R. LILLICH, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: CONVENTION AND COM-
MENTARY 120 (1982).
In addition, two federal statutes contain specific references to terrorism. Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801). Section 101(c) defines terrorism as actions that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
In fact, Congress recently has passed legislation requesting the Presi-
dent to begin negotiations leading to an international convention that
would prevent and control terrorism. 14 8 Significantly, Congress gave
high priority to defining the behavior constituting terrorism.1 ,9
Scholars have identified the elements of terrorism as: (a) intent, (b)
substance, and (c) jurisdiction. 150
The principle underlying both the first amendment and the Hel-
sinki Accords is the concept of an open "marketplace of ideas."
Under the first amendment, United States citizens are guaranteed
the rights to receive and exchange ideas with whomever they wish.
The Basket III provisions of the Accords extend this principle to the
international arena by facilitating the free exchange of ideas and
persons across national borders. The Accords, as an international
declaration, seek to accomplish universal freedom of expression, a
goal which is of particular significance to the international commu-
nity of writers.
Current United States immigration law and regulation, however,
is used to exclude foreigners from the United States because of their
ideological orientation. Amending the ideological exclusion provi-
sions of the INA along the lines proposed by pending legislation and
this Article's recommendations would do much toward eradicating
the most egregious violations of the Helsinki Accords by the United
States. The amendments will serve to strengthen the principles of
democracy and pluralism both at home and around the world.
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
any State;
(2) appear to be intended -
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping;
and
(D) to occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national bounda-
ries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetra-
tors operate or seek asylum ....
Id. § 101(c).
See also Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, § 1201, Pub.
L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853, 895-96.
148. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, § 1201(a), 100
Stat. at 895-96 (Sense of Congress that the President should establish a process to en-
courage the negotiation of an international convention to prevent and control all aspects
of international terrorism).
149. Id. § 1201(c)(1), 100 Stat. at 896 (the international convention should pro-
vide an explicit definition of terrorism). See REP. No. 783, supra note 139 (legislative
history states that "the negotiation of a definition of conduct constituting terrorism ...
is a higher priority").
150. Levitt, supra note 140, at 99, 104; Falvey, supra note 140, at 323. Interna-
tional Terrorism: International and National Efforts to Deter and Punish Terrorists, 9
B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 323.
